

# *Access Control Enforcement for Conversation-based Web Services*

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

# Overview



- The conversational model of Web services
- Security concerns
- Access control based on conversations
  - K-trustworthiness
- The technique
- The architecture
- Conclusions



# Web Services

- A Web service is characterized by the set of (atomic) **operations** that it exports ...
- ... and possibly by constraints on the possible **conversations**
  - Using a service typically involves performing sequences of operations in a particular order (**conversations**)
  - During a conversation, the client typically chooses the next operation to invoke on the basis of previous results, among the ones that the service allows at that point




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

# Transition Systems

- A transition system (TS) is a tuple  $T = \langle A, S, S^0, \delta, F \rangle$  where:
  - $A$  is the set of actions
  - $S$  is the set of states
  - $S^0 \subseteq S$  is the set of initial states
  - $\delta \subseteq S \times A \times S$  is the transition relation
  - $F \subseteq S$  is the set of final states



- **Initial state:** the client starts the interaction
- **Final state(s):** the client can terminate the interaction (it has reached its own goal and the service is not "dangling")

# The Conversational Model



Abstract Behavior of the Service:

Do until Client selects "end"

1. Give Client a choice of actions to be performed
2. Wait for Client choice
3. Perform action chosen by Client

Conversations supported by the service as a TS

# Security Concerns



- Access Control
  - Credentials
    - signed assertions describing properties of a subject that are used to establish trust between two unknown communicating parties before allowing access to information or services
  - Access control policies
    - rules stating that only subjects with certain credentials satisfying specific conditions can invoke a given operation of the Web service

# Current Approaches (1)



- Single operation model
  - operations are not related to ("independent" from) each other
- Access control is enforced
  - at the level of the *entire Web service*
    - the Web service could ask the client, in advance, to provide all the credentials associated with all operations of that Web Service
  - ➔ - A subject will always arrive at the end of whichever conversation
  - ✘ - The subject will become aware of *all policies on the basis of which access control is enforced*
  - ✘ - The client may have to submit more credentials than needed



# Current Approaches (2)



- at the level of *single operations*
  - to require only the credentials associated with the next operation that the client wants to perform
- ➔ - Asking from the subject only the credentials necessary to gain access to the requested operation
- ✘ - The subject is continuously solicited to provide credentials for each transition
- ✘ - After several steps, the client may reach a state in which it cannot progress because the lack of credentials (and *the service provider has wasted resources*)

# Challenges



- Access control not only at the level of single operation
- Should consider conversations
  - Willingness of the client to reach a "goal"
  - Willingness of the service provider not to waste resources
  - Willingness of the service provider to limit disclosure of access control policies

# The Idea




- Considering access control mainly at the level of conversations (sequences of operations leading to a final state of the TS)
- The service provider gives a  $k$ -trustworthiness level  $k$  to a client in a given state
- On the basis of such a  $k$ , asks the client to provide credentials for the conversations of length less/equal  $k$  (starting from the current state and with operations not yet "controlled")


# *The Rationale (1)*



- The approach maximizes the **likelihood** that a client reaches a final state and doesn't drop off due to lack of authorization
  - Likelihood and not **guarantee** as the client is free, and can take different conversations
- The approach maximizes also the likelihood that the service provider doesn't waste resources, even without disclosing the access policies



# Example




**Conversations from  $S_0$ :**

- chooseItem, addToCart, saveForLater
- chooseItem, addToCart, checkout, completeTransaction

**Hence the k-levels for  $S_0$  are {3,4}**

**k-levels for  $S_2$  are {1,2}**

# Interaction Model



# Basic Concepts (1)



- Credential
  - Attribute (pair <name, value>)
- Attribute condition
- A credential satisfies an attribute condition if one among its attributes makes true the condition
- Operation access control policy
  - Rule specifying credentials and attribute conditions to grant access to the operation
  - Can be checked by a reasoning service that verifies if the access request is a logical consequence of the policy and the credentials

# Basic Concepts (2)



- Conversation access control policy
  - Conjunction of the access control policies of the operations in the conversation
- Trustworthiness level
  - Length of "allowed" conversations
- k-trust policies
  - Given a state with different possible k-levels, defines which one to assign



# The Technique (1)



- Given a TS, compute, for each state, all the possible k-levels
  - Requires computing all possible conversations
  - Are infinite for cyclic TSs !!
  - But for access control, once an operation has been checked, we do not have to check again
- We need to resort to the concept of
  - strongly connected component (SCC) of a TS
  - Graph of SCCs ( $G^{SCC}$ ): acyclic, and can be computed by the Tarjan's algorithm

# The Technique (2)



- For any SCC, we need to determine all possible conversations that will lead from an in-going node, i.e., coming from outside the component, to an out-going node, i.e., going outside the component
- These conversations should have the properties to cover all potential operations within the given strongly connected component
  - Given a node in  $G^{SCC}$ , formal concepts of **cardinality, coverage and rank**

# *The Technique (3)*





- The overall idea of the algorithm, which finds all potential  $k$ -trustworthiness levels for all states, is:
  - for a given state, determine all subsequent SCCs, including the one to which the current state belongs to
  - Traverse the transition system from that state and record all conversations leading to a final state

# The Technique (4) [An Example]



4 is the cardinality of  $C_1$ , as there are 4 different symbols: {c,g,h,e}  
7 is the coverage, as you need a sequence of length 7 (c f e f h f c f g f c f e) to include all the four symbols going from the root to the end of the SCC



$C_1$  is the image (SCC) of the set of states {S1, S3, S5}

# Architecture



Dipartimento di Informatica e Sistemistica "Antonio Ruberti"  
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
Discovery Park



PURDUE UNIVERSITY



The Cyber Center



# Conclusions & Future Works



- A novel technique for access control enforcement taking into account the conversational nature of Web service
  - tradeoff between step-by-step (minimize the disclosure by maximizing the risk) and request-all (minimize the risk by maximizing the disclosure)
  - Good if k-level assignment is fine tuned (through client profiling)
- Conclude the on-going implementation of the access control enforcement platform
  - Performance and scalability tests
- Apply the idea of k-trustworthiness to Web service choreographies
  - Compositions (i.e., orchestrators a-la Roman way) are already seamlessly included in the model



# *Backup*

# *The Rationale (2)*

## *[A Simple Probability Model]*



- Given an operation  $a$ , we consider  $P_a$  as the probability that the client DOES NOT have the credential(s) satisfying the access control policy guarding the operation
- *Damage* of having a client dropping off is the number of executed operations
- *Leakage* in terms of disclosure of access control policies is proportional to the number of executed operations
- Let's consider a conversation  $conv = \{a_1, \dots, a_n\}$



# The Rationale (3)

## [A Simple Probability Model]

- Step-by-step

- Risk faced before involving the  $i$ -th operation ( $a_i$  is the next operation the client may not possess credentials)

$$R_i = P_{a_i} f(i - 1) \quad i = 1 \dots n$$

- Leakage after the  $i$ -th operation ( $a_{i+1}$  is the next operation)

$$L_i = P_{a_{i+1}} f_i \quad i = 1 \dots n$$

- Conversation-based

- Risk faced after conv (being conv the conversation the service provider has requested the credentials)

$$R_i = \prod_{j=1}^n P_{a_j} f = 0 \quad i = 1 \dots n$$


- Leakage after the  $i$ -th operation ( $a_{i+1}$  is the next operation)

$$L_i = P_{a_{i+1}} f n \quad i = 1 \dots n$$

Metric	Step-by-step	Conversation
Risk : $\sum_{i=1}^n R_i$	$P \frac{n \cdot (n-1)}{2}$	0
Leakage : $\mathcal{L}_n$	$n$	$n$

# The Rationale (4)

## [A Simple Probability Model]



Conversation based is a tradeoff between step-by-step (minimize the disclosure by maximizing the risk) and request-all (minimize the risk by maximizing the disclosure)  
 Good if k-level assignment is fine tuned (through client profiling)

Metric	step-by-step	k-level: 2	k-level: 4	request-all
ab				
Risk	$2 \cdot \mathcal{P}$	0	0	0
Leakage	2	2	5	5
acde				
Risk	$6 \cdot \mathcal{P}$	$0 + 3 \cdot \mathcal{P}$	0	0
Leakage	4	5	5	5

